The first publication of the EBP is Ruins to Recovery: An 18-month Assessment of Reconstruction Efforts which includes four separate reports.
Report 1: Public Sector Reconstruction: Education, Health, and Public Infrastructure
Report 2: Housing Reconstruction After the October 2005 Earthquake
Report 3: Challenges in Monitoring Post-Earthquake Livelihood Reconstruction
Report 4: An Evaluation of ERRA-WB Livelihood Support Cash Grant
Our four reports point to a critical need for effective monitoring and evaluation of earthquake reconstruction programs. While the tragic pictures of the 8th October 2005 earthquake and the overwhelming response of Pakistanis from all over the world remain as part of our collective memories, the slow pace of reconstruction despite donor funds at hand and the mismanagement of programs by ERRA are disturbing and require explanation. Most recently, an analysis of ERRA’s recent 2007 audit also indicated that there were fiscal irregularities in the housing sector (DAWN News, February 12). In the absence of citizens’ watchdog group, accountability and transparency appear to be seriously undermined in reconstruction efforts. Instead of ERRA’s stated strategy of “Building Back Better” the affected population of northern regions will be left behind as a result of this natural disaster. (top)
Hard copies of this publication are avaialble on request. Click here for contact details. Download the pdf version of the report here.
Public Sector Reconstruction: Education, Health, and Public Infrastructure
The first report examines ERRA’s efforts in recovery over the past 18-months, and it aims to answer the question of whether ERRA is on target with rebuilding the public infrastructure. This report includes seven separate chapters. Chapter 1 presents a general overview of the earthquake affected region, which is historically underdeveloped and inaccessible given the rugged mountainous terrain. Chapter 2 discusses the methods and limitations of the data in our analysis. Chapter 3 discusses the reconstruction costs and needs after the disaster and paints a broad picture of donor pledges, commitments, and disbursements. This chapter also examines the allocation of reconstruction funds by sectors. Chapters 4 and 5 measure progress in the education and health sector, and chapter 6 examines developments in the public infrastructure-- governance, power and energy, transportation, and water and sanitation. The last chapter offers conclusions and recommendations based on our analysis.
A quick synopsis of our analysis of these sectors suggests that in most cases even when a large proportion of committed donor funds have been disbursed to ERRA, it has only spent about one-half the funds and reconstruction efforts remain slow and far behind set targets, but the bottleneck does not appear to be funding as monies are available to ERRA. Yet, ERRA updates and progress reports do not offer any explanation for these significant delays in reconstruction. Furthermore, the abundance of available information has not meant greater accountability or transparency on part of the Government of Pakistan or ERRA. Most of the reports are repetitive and reconstruction strategy is painted with broad brushstrokes. The progress updates and annual reviews discuss accomplishments without any means by which to measure improvement.(top)
Housing Reconstruction After the October 2005 Earthquake
The second report in this publication examines progress in a sector that was devastated and affected the lives of over 3.5 million persons. Over 80 percent of houses in three districts--Bagh, Muzaffarabad and parts of Neelum, and Poonch--in the state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and 36 percent of houses in five districts--Abbottabad, Batagram, Kohistan, Mansehra, and Shangla--in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) were destroyed. Rehabilitation and reconstruction posed an immense challenge for the affected people and to the Government of Pakistan.
ERRA soon unveiled its plans for providing financial assistance for owner-driven reconstruction of private houses. A more detailed housing strategy was outlined in April 2006, which highlighted the need for construction of seismically safe houses. The strategy was a conditional cash grant for home owners to construct a seismically safe house, and once given criteria was met then further tranche of funds would be released. Of the total monies allocated for reconstruction, the housing sector claimed one-third (USD 2.38 billion) of the funds. This includes rural housing cost of USD 1.49 billion, urban housing USD 66 million and USD 820 million for urban town development plans.
Initially it had been anticipated that people would complete rebuilding houses by the winter of 2006, but since then the expected dates have been continuously revised. Two and half years down the road the progress of reconstruction in the housing sector has been slow; reconstruction of only half of the completely destroyed houses has been completed. ERRA does not provide any explanation for the slow pace of reconstruction. And our review and analysis indicates that information is presented in ways to conceal the real picture on progress. Moreover, our analysis suggests that funds have been disbursed even when beneficiaries have not been identified. This fiscal irregularity is disturbing and needs to be further investigated.(top)
Challenges in Monitoring Post-Earthquake Livelihood Reconstruction
The biggest challenge in tracking the reconstruction and rehabilitation budget for the livelihood sector thus far has been the lack of an overall official needs estimate that includes the two dimensions of rehabilitation of the livelihood sector, i.e. income generating capacity component and means for livelihoods component. Yet, the impact of death, injury, and loss of housing, and in some cases agricultural land and livestock, has meant that families already on the edge of survival have inched closer to penury. Moreover, the destruction of a house, and ERRA strategy of having the homeowner present for receiving the housing grant has meant that those males who would have migrated out of the region for employment have had to stay behind. However, locally there is limited employment and this has created even greater importance for the livelihood sector.
The livelihood sector is fraught with confusion, and a lack of a comprehensive strategy. There has been a gap in information including an absence of an overall needs estimate, coupled with the lack of a comprehensive list of projects, incomplete information on known projects and incongruent information dissemination processes by ERRA. The tracking of progress, including monetary flows, can be partial at best. The size of the actual gap between the livelihood reconstruction and rehabilitation needs cannot be adequately determined. The final picture is incomplete, and from the bits of information that exist we cannot adequately determine how much is being achieved in the livelihood sector. (top)
An Evaluation of ERRA-WB Livelihood Support Cash Grant
The last and final report in this publication is on the Livelihoods Support Cash Grants, a World Bank funded project providing USD 50 per month for six months to a selected group of vulnerable families in all of the affected districts. The program costing USD 85 million was funded through a larger USD 400 million earthquake recovery loan. We include it here to illustrate how a well intended project can have multiplicity of issues, including fiscal mismanagement. In this case, one in two families receiving the cash grant was deserving of the benefit, and one in two families were not deserving of the cash benefit. Moreover, one in two families that should have received the cash grant was excluded from the benefit. The report also points to cultural issues with respect to women’s mobility and access to public goods, in particular their exclusion. This case study of a small cash grant discloses that half the funds, over one-half the funds, did not reach their target as defined by the Livelihood Support Cash Grants program itself.
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